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Abstract 
We intend to reveal the causes and the determinants of the omitted shareholder proposals. We find that individual 
investors are mostly likely to submit a proposal being excluded from the proxy ballot. Since individual investors are 
not so skillful as institutional investors, we summarize that shareholder proposals are excluded mainly due to 
sponsors’ lack of experience and knowledge, rather than as a self-serving vehicle for shareholder activists to gain 
bargaining power or to simply annoy management. We also find that most shareholder proposals are omitted 
because they deal with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Shareholder proposals have attracted significant attention in recent years. For instance, Wall 
Street Journal (WSJ hereafter) reported that on March 2013, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. lost its 
battle against CTW Investment Group due to ignoring CTW’s shareholder proposal calling for 
separation of the chairman and CEO positions. CTW argued that the chairman’s role should be 
filled by an outsider for the purpose of promoting “the robust oversight and accountability of 
management”. In response to Goldman’ statement, claiming that the proposal from CTW 
Investment Group was "inherently vague and indefinite”, the SEC notified the Goldman Sachs, 
saying that “the agency is unable to concur with Goldman's view that the shareholder proposal 
does not warrant a vote”. One month later, prior to the releasing of proxy statements by 
Goldman, CTW withdrew this proposal after Goldman agreed to bolster the role of its lead 
director, Dieter Waizenegger. Even though this proposal has never appeared in the proxy ballot, 
it certainly has caught the attention of the media, whose coverage on this issue has made the 
public, especially the shareholders of Goldman Sachs, be aware of the core arguments between 
the two parties.  
Indeed, many shareholder proposals that are submitted never make it onto a proxy ballot. In 
some instances, shareholder proposals have been withdrawn by the sponsors after the private 
negotiations with the management. In other cases, the companies have excluded the proposals 
without the consent of the sponsors after receiving the no action letters written by the SEC. 
Hence, the shareholder proposals listed in a company’s proxy ballot for voting at the annual 
shareholder meetings do not present a complete picture. For instance, among all Fortune 250 
 firms, prior to the end of August of 2013, there are a total of 277 shareholder proposals voted at 
the annual shareholder meetings. In comparison, about 104 proposals are ruled out from the 
proxy statements with formal no action letters written by the SEC. Such a high omitting rate is 
perplexing, in that it does not make any sense for anybody to take such an unproductive 
approach, let alone those professional investors and executives, since the rules interpreting “no 
action request” proposal have been clearly defined in the SEC’s Staff Legal Bulletin 14 and the 
SEC Rule 14a (8) in 2001. Thereby, it remains a puzzle as to why it ever occurs. To our 
knowledge, the studies covering this topic are still lacking in the literature. However, a better 
understanding of this subject can not only help the SEC to set up more appropriate regulations, 
but also facilitate investors to improve monitoring capabilities. We fill up the gap in this study by 
focusing on those shareholder proposals that have been excluded by the management. Our study 
intends to reveal the causes and the determinants of the omitted shareholder proposals. We find 
that individual investors are mostly likely to submit a proposal being excluded from the proxy 
ballot. Since individual investors are not so skillful as institutional investors, we thus summarize 
that shareholder proposals are excluded mainly due to sponsors’ lack of experience and 
knowledge, rather than as a self-serving vehicle for shareholder activists to gain bargaining 
power or to simply annoy management. Furthermore, most shareholder proposals are omitted 
because they deal with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we explained the SEC rules and reviewed the 
literature. In section 3, we brought up the hypothesis and discussed the empirical results. 
Conclusion was provided in section 4.  
 
Section II the SEC rules covering shareholder proposals and the literature review 
The SEC Rule 14a-8 was released in 2001. It requires the company to choose one of the three 
options for the received shareholder proposals: 1) Include the proposal in its proxy materials; 2) 
Negotiate with the proposal sponsor to reach a jointly acceptable solution which can result in this 
proposal being withdrawn; 3) Submit a No-Action request to the SEC to exclude the proposal 
from the proxy documents, if companies affirm that a proposal violates the SEC Rule 14a-8. The 
detailed description of the shareholder proposals that are appropriate for “No-Action request” is 
provided in Staff Legal bulletin 14. Once receiving a No-Action request, the SEC will analyze it 
thoroughly before making a final decision.     
Prior researches reveal that most of the submitted shareholder proposals have been voted at 
the annual shareholder meetings. Studies covering the voted shareholder proposals are abundant, 
even though it is still inconclusive as to whether or not they can be an effective tool to mitigate 
agency costs (Bebchuck, Cohen , and Ferrell, 2009; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Renneboog and 
Szilagyi, 2011; Ertimur , Ferri, and Stubben, 2010; Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke, 2008; Thomas 
and Cotter, 2007). At the same time, a great amount of shareholder proposals have never made it 
onto a proxy ballot because they were taken back by the proposals sponsors. Less than 20% of 
shareholder proposals ever submitted fall into this category (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Renneboog 
and Szilagyi, 2011). Countable studies in this area show that those withdrawn proposals are more 
likely to occur when shareholder activists are powerful and when the proposals cover sensitive 
issues (Foley, Cebula, and Boylan, 2013). Nevertheless, to our knowledge, there is a lack of 
studies in the literature focusing on the omitted shareholder proposals, the incident of which is 
difficult to understand since the corresponding rules have been clearly explained in SEC Rule 
14a-8 and the SEC’s Staff Legal Bulletin 14 in 2001. The details of the relevant rules are 
presented in the appendix.  
  
Section Three: Empirical Analysis of Omitted Shareholder Proposals 
3.1 Hypotheses 
A Shareholder proposal can be omitted from the company’s proxy materials. First, the 
management needs to send a no action request to the SEC. Next, after reviewing the documents, 
the SEC will make choices to support either the company or the proposal sponsors. The 
followings are several examples of the SEC criterion: (1) the proposal reflects a personal 
grievance; (2) the proposal requires the firm to violate state, federal, or international law; or (3) 
the proposal deals with the company in question’s ordinary business operations. Only after 
receiving an approval from the SEC can management exclude the shareholder proposal. Once the 
proposal is legally excluded from the proxy lists, it will never be implemented. By contrast, a 
withdrawn proposal might be implemented eventually.  
SEC rules 14a-8 are presumably well comprehended by professional investors, such as 
unions. Those skilled shareholders are not expected to waste valuable resources to sponsor 
proposals that tend to be overlooked by management. Thus, we hypothesize that when a proposal 
is submitted by non-professional sponsors, such as individuals and religious groups, this proposal 
is more likely to be omitted. Furthermore, since the subject of the proposal determines whether 
or not it could be ruled out, we hypothesize that the likelihood of a proposal being excluded 
increases when its theme is closely tied to the firm’s ordinary business operation.  
3.2 Data  
To investigate the hypotheses in Section 3.1, we gathered information of shareholder 
proposals from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) which collects the proxy 
statements of over 1,900 firms, including S&P 1500. In total, there were 2,743 shareholder 
proposals related to corporate governance issues for the period 2004 through 2007. Furthermore, 
we focused on firms in The Corporate Library (TCL) and collected information on antitakeover 
provisions, and ownership by insiders for the period 2005-2007.  There were a total of 8,257 
observations in the sample period. After merging with shareholder proposals dataset, we had a 
total of 1,806 shareholder proposals related to corporate governance issues. 
Moreover, we control for firm size, leverage, and firm performance. Firm size, proxied by 
total assets, as well as leverage, is collected from COMPUSTAT. Firm performance is measured 
by stock returns on a fiscal year basis from CRSP. We also control for insider ownership and 
collect relevant data from TCL. Additionally, we use E-Index as a proxy for corporate 
governance quality (Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell, 2009).  
Lastly, following Gillan and Starks (2000) and Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011), we divided 
the sample of shareholder proposals into five major groups according to proposal sponsors: 
Individual investors, religious investors, institutional investors, unions, and public pension funds. 
We also split the data into eight key groups according to issues: Antitakeover issues, board, 
executive compensation, voting, sales of the company, auditing, annual meeting, and others.   
Based on IRRC, each group was broken down further into four subsets, with each representing 
one of the four proposal outcomes: voted, withdrawn, omitted, and others.  
3.3 Descriptive Analysis 
To test the hypotheses in Section 3.1, we analyze the percentage of proposals that are omitted 
among variant shareholder activists and the results can be found in Table 1.     
Table 1 indicates that the percentages of proposals that are excluded range from 10.48% to 
16.74%. The proposals from religious investors are the least likely to be omitted, followed by 
other institutional investors and public pension funds. Union investors are second only to 
 individual investors to face omitted proposals, with an annual average of 1.65%. However, the 
occurrence of such proposals is becoming less common, dropping to 0.27% in 2007. Not 
surprisingly, management is mostly likely to take no actions against proposals from individual 
investors, the least professional investors among all shareholder activists. Each year, about 
9.49%, the average, are submitted by individual investors but are omitted eventually.  
Moreover, regarding omitted shareholder proposals, the differences among variant proposal 
topics are less obvious than those among variant proposal proponents. However, some specific 
topics are still more likely to be omitted. Table 2 reports the relevant comparison among 
different topics of shareholder proposals. The results show that antitakeover, executive 
compensation, and board issues as the top three subjects that related proposals are more likely to 
be omitted, with an annual average of 4.51%, 3.56% and 2.73%, respectively. Interestingly, the 
exclusion rate of proposals devoting to antitakeover issues has been steadily dropping, but that 
related to study of the sale of the company is increasing until 2006. This fact is within the 
expectation in that the latter is more closely related to the company’s ordinary business 
operations that can be omitted under rule 14a-8. To further explore the omission of shareholder 
proposals, we combine all omitted proposals together according to proposal proponents and 
proposal subjects. The results are reported in Table 3.  
Table 3 shows that 32.49% of all omitted shareholder proposals are submitted by individual 
investors regarding antitakeover issues, followed by 19.05%, 13.75%, both from individual 
shareholders regarding executive compensation and board issues, respectively. The three groups 
constitute over 65% of all proposals that are omitted, implying that it is individual investor that 
might lack of knowledge and experience with respect to SEC rules. Furthermore, 14.49% of 
omitted proposals are from unions, among which, 4.48% and 4.20% of proposals cover issues 
regarding board and executive compensations. Unions’ omitted rate seems high. However, as 
shown in Table 2, unlike individual sponsors, unions’ absolute exclusion rate is actually low, 
since unions have sponsored more shareholder proposals than the other groups. In sum, our 
findings thus far tend to support our hypothesis indicating that professional investors are less 
likely to submit proposals against SEC rules. 
Additionally, by reasons of exclusion, Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS) classifies 
omitted proposals into 19 categories. Following the ISS, we summarize all omitted shareholder 
proposals by those 19 categories. Table 4 and Table 5 report these results.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 4 and Table 5 describe in detail the omission reasons with respect to the issues and the 
proposal proponents of those omitted proposals, respectively. Specifically, there are 82 proposals 
covering antitakeover issues that are omitted and recorded as I-10. B-2, I-2, I-3, I-7, and I-10 are 
the most likely reasons for this group of proposals’ being omitted, indicating that proponents do 
not provide verification of stock ownership, or that those proposals violate laws, contain 
misleading statements, relate to the conduct of the company’s ordinary business operations, or 
are moot by virtue of already being substantially implemented by the company, respectively. 
Moreover, for proposals related to voting and board membership issues, the most likely reasons 
for no action taken are I-8 and I-6, indicating that those proposals deal with a matter beyond the 
company's power to influence or relate to an election to office, respectively. Focusing on 
proposals sponsored by individuals, we identify 88 proposals cancelled as I-10, followed by 31 
and 22, because of B-2 and I-2, respectively. Additionally, this group of omitted proposals 
appears in all ISS omission categories. In contrast, the remaining groups of omitted proposals, 
 including unions, are more concentrated. There are 13 union sponsored proposals that are 
omitted due to I-7, followed by 9 and 8 due to I-11 and I-10, respectively. I-11 indicates 
duplication of an earlier submitted proposal.   
In sum, we find evidence that the occurrences of proposals that are excluded eventually are 
mainly due to sponsors’ lack of experience and knowledge, rather than those proposals being a 
de facto self-serving vehicle for shareholder activists to gain bargaining power or to simply 
annoy management, and so forth. Furthermore, most shareholder proposals are omitted because 
they deal with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary business operations. 
3.5 Regression Results 
To further demonstrate the hypotheses regarding the associations between the likelihood of a 
proposal’s being omitted and proposal sponsors and subjects, we applied a logistic regression 
cluster - robust variance model by treating the appearance of an omitted proposal as an event and 
the occurrence of an excluded proposal as the base, while controlling for firm performance, E-
Index, insider ownership, leverage, and firm size (Cameron, Trivedi, 2005).  
The model adopted is expressed, as follows:  
Logit(omitted_proposal)  
=  β0 + β1Individual + β2Religion + β3Union + β4Investment_firm + β5Antitakeover + β6Board 
+ β7Executive_Compensation + β8Voting + β9E-Index + β10Stock_return + β11insider%  
+ β12Leverage + β13Size + β14Individual * Antitakeover + β15Individual * Executive_comp  
+ β16Union * Board + β17Union*Executive_comp + β18Year_06 + β19Year_07                    (2)                                
The sample under study contained 1,294 observations, from which 251 proposals were 
omitted and 1,043 proposals were voted over the 2005 through 2007 study period. Furthermore, 
when an omitted proposal occurred, it was recorded as a 1; otherwise, it was recorded as a 0. 
The results are reported in Table 6.  
Model One confirms that when a proposal is submitted by individual investors, it is more 
likely to be excluded from the proxy ballot than to be voted. However, a similar conclusion 
cannot be drawn among religious investors who are inexperienced shareholders as well. Of note, 
the base class for types of investors is public pension fund. Furthermore, when a proposal is 
associated with board, executive compensation, or voting issues, it is less likely to be omitted 
rather than voted. Since the base category for the proposal subjects is related to ordinary business 
operations, such as sales of the company and others sales, we conclude that shareholder 
proposals are more likely to be omitted when they deal with a matter relating to the company’s 
ordinary business operations. Moreover, when looking at control variables, we find that the 
likelihood of a proposal being omitted increases with firm size but decreases with leverage ratio.  
Model Two is based on Model One with two new variables: one for corporate governance 
quality, E-Index; and the other one for insider ownership. The results tend to show that the 
likelihood of a proposal being omitted decreases with both E-index and insider ownership. All 
the other results are similar to those in Model One.  
 As a robustness test as shown in Model Three, we add several interaction variables for 
proposal sponsors and subjects. The prior findings still hold.  
The following Figure 1 to Figure 8 further demonstrate the regression results.  
     
Figure 1: Individual * Total Assets   Figure 2: Individual * Insider Ownership 
 
    
Figure 3: Union * Total Assets   Figure 4: Union * Insider Ownership 
 
    
Figure 5: Antitakeover * Total Assets   Figure 6: Board * Total Asset 
 
     
Figure 7: Executive-Compensation * Total Assets  Figure 8: Voting * Total Asset 
 
In summation, the sponsors’ lack of knowledge, combined with the subject raised in the 
proposal, are the major causes for the proposal being omitted rather than voted. Additionally, the 
occurrence of omitted shareholder proposals is related to firm size, leverage, E-index and insider 
ownership. In specific, when a firm is large, with less insider ownership, low leverage, and poor 
corporate governance quality as measured by small value of E-Index, a shareholder proposal is 
more likely to be omitted.  
In June of 2009, the SEC proposed changes to federal proxy rules in facilitating shareholder 
director nominations; said proposed changes were adopted in August of 2010. In October of 
2010, the SEC proposed say-on-pay rules, which were finalized in January of 2011. Those 
changes in regulation, along with the eruption of the financial crisis in 2008, can potentially 
impact how shareholders deal with shareholder resolutions. Therefore, as a robustness test, we 
analyze shareholder proposals in the proxy seasons after 2007. There were 751 shareholder 
proposals submitted in 2008, among which 146 proposals were withdrawn and 161 proposals 
were omitted. The higher percentage of omitted proposals might be due to shareholders’ 
overreaction to the volatile financial market during the financial crisis. In 2009, 743 shareholder 
resolutions were submitted, among which 121 proposals were withdrawn and 81 proposals were 
excluded. Thus, it appears that the activities with respect to shareholder proposals in recent years 
seem to be reasonably similar to that from over the 2004-2007 period.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this study is to extend the research into the effectiveness and role of shareholder 
proposals in corporate governance. Prior studies mainly concentrate on the voted proposals and 
find that management which overlooked proposals that were supported by the majority 
shareholders tend to be penalized, which suggests the effectiveness of using shareholder 
proposals as a means whereby to discipline management. However, some shareholder proposals 
have never made it onto proxy ballot. They were either withdrawn by shareholders or excluded 
by the management prior to the annual shareholder meetings. The published studies focusing on 
the withdrawn or omitted shareholder proposals are still limited. In this study, we endeavor to 
contribute to this literature by proceeding with a detailed study in shareholder proposals that are 
omitted and by exploring what determines a shareholder resolution as being omitted [within the 
context of proposal sponsors and issues, firm performance, insider ownership, and corporate 
governance quality].   
 Focusing on shareholder proposals related to corporate governance from 2004 to 2007, we 
find that on average 10% of shareholder proposals are excluded from the proxy ballot. Further, 
the occurrence of the excluded shareholder proposals is mainly due to sponsors’ lack of 
experience and knowledge. In other words, the omitted shareholder proposals are due to 
sponsor’s mistakes or misinformation. The issue of a proposal that might intervene in the 
company’s ordinary business operations is another major cause for a proposal being excluded. 
The future study can focus on the changes in resolutions of shareholder proposals after recent 
modifications in rules since the onset of the financial crisis.  
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 TABLE 1   
Summary of Shareholder Proposal Sponsors and Proposal Resolutions  
 
     Table 1 reports the percentages of shareholder proposals from 2004 to 2007 that are voted, withdrawn, and omitted, respectively. There are a total of 2,743 
corporate governance related proposals, classified into five sponsor groups.    
 
 
   2004 2005 2006 2007 
Sponsor Voted  Withdrawn  Omitted       Voted  Withdrawn  Omitted  Voted  Withdrawn  Omitted  Voted  Withdrawn  Omitted  
Individual investors  25.97 0.86 10.04 23.05 1.17 10.72 29.15 1.29 9.02 26.21 3.76 8.20 
Religious/socially 
responsible investor  2.58 0.72 0.14 4.99 0.73 0.44 3.38 0.97 0.48 2.55 0.67 0.00 
Union funds  21.38 14.63 2.44 22.76 11.60 3.08 26.89 10.31 0.81 21.91 18.01 0.27 
Public pension funds  1.43 3.73 0.57 1.91 3.08 1.91 1.77 1.61 0.32 3.49 1.88 1.08 
Other institutions  1.72 2.30 0.43 1.62 2.35 0.59 2.74 2.25 0.64 2.28 2.69 0.94 
Total (%) 53.08 22.24 13.63 54.33 18.94 16.74 63.93 16.43 11.27 56.45 27.02 10.48 
 TABLE 2   
Summary of Shareholder Proposal Issues and Proposal Resolutions  
 
Table 2 reports the yearly volume of shareholder proposals in accordance with the proposal issues and the final resolutions from 2004 through 2007. There are a 
total of 2,743 corporate governance related proposals, classified into eight subject groups.    
  
 Year 2004 2005 2006   2007   
Proposals Subtotal Vote 
With- 
draw Omit Other  
Sub-
total V W O Other  
Sub-
total V W O Other 
Sub-
total V W O Other 
Antitakeover  179 110 15 41 13 152 97 8 30 17 174 106 18 33 17 153 102 25 18 8 
Voting issues 48 33 7 6 2 119 78 24 13 4 176 116 40 1 19 182 67 106 0 9 
Board issues 115 69 11 17 18 153 86 20 28 19 135 103 12 12 8 180 137 14 18 11 
Executive 
compensatio
n 241 139 50 18 34 184 81 59 33 11 105 53 32 18 2 172 90 46 29 7 
Study sale of 
company 8 3 1 1 3 13 7 0 2 4 9 5 0 3 1 8 5 0 0 3 
Audit-related 86 7 68 9 2 25 1 17 4 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Annual/speci
al meeting 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 0 2 2 0 
Others 17 11 4 1 1 35 20 1 4 10 19 14 0 2 3 45 19 8 11 7 
Total 
proposals 697 370 155 95 73 681 370 129 114 68 621 397 102 70 52 744 420 201 78 45 
 TABLE 3 
Summary of Withdrawn Shareholder Proposal and Proposal Resolutions  
 
Table 3 reports the percentages of shareholder proposals that are withdrawn, omitted and voted from 2004 to 2007. There are a total of 2,743 corporate 
governance related proposals, classified into eight subject groups. Within each group, they are classified into five sponsor groups.  
 
Proposal 
Status Sponsor / Issues Antitakeover  Audit Board 
Executive 
Compensation 
Sale of 
Company Voting 
Special 
Meeting Others Subtotal  
Withdrawn Individual (%) 3.07 0.17 0.68 1.37 0.17 2.56 0.17 0.17 8.36 
  Union (%) 4.44 11.60 1.19 22.35 0.00 23.55 0.17 1.19 64.49 
  Public Pension Funds (%) 0.85 2.73 1.37 3.75 0.00 3.24 0.00 0.34 12.28 
  Other Institutions  (%) 2.56 0.00 4.78 3.24 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.17 11.26 
  Religious (%) 0.34 0.00 1.71 1.19 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 3.58 
  Subtotal  11.26 14.51 9.73 31.91 0.17 30.20 0.34 1.88 100  
Omitted Individual (%) 32.49 0.84 13.73 19.05 1.68 2.52 0.56 1.96 72.83 
  Union (%) 0.84 2.80 4.48 4.20 0.00 1.12 0.00 0.84 14.28 
  Public Pension Funds (%) 0.56 0.28 1.12 1.68 0.00 1.68 0.28 0.28 5.88 
  Other Institutions (%) 0.28 0.00 1.40 1.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.24 5.04 
  Religious (%) 0.00 0.00 0.28. 1.40 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.68 
  Subtotal  34.17 3.92 21.01 27.45 1.68 5.60 0.84 5.32 100  
Voted Individual (%) 16.65 0.00 9.17 10.97 0.70 6.68  - 0.80 44.97 
  Union (%) 6.08 0.10 2.99 16.15 0.00 17.35  - 0.40 43.07 
  Public Pension Funds (%) 2.49 0.30 0.60 0.70 0.00 0.30  - 0.00 4.39 
  Other Institutions (%) 0.60 0.00 0.50 0.70 0.60 0.10  - 0.20 2.69 
  Religious (%) 0.30 0.00 2.59 1.89 0.00 0.10  - 0.00 4.89 
  Subtotal  26.12 0.40 15.85 30.41 1.30 24.53  - 1.40 100  
 TABLE 4 
Summary of the Reasons for Shareholder Proposals Being Omitted According to Proposal Issues  
  
      Table 4 summarizes the reasons for shareholder proposals being omitted by proposal issues from 2004 to 2007.  
Omit Status Antitakeover Audit Board 
Executive 
Compensation Voting Meeting 
Sell 
firm Other Total  
omitted B-1 2 1 4 6 1 0 0 3 17 
omitted B-2 12 1 7 12 0 0 2 1 35 
omitted C 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 
omitted E-2 3 0 3 6 0 0 1 0 13 
omitted H-3 8 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 16 
omitted I-1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 4 
omitted I-2 2 0 4 14 0 3 0 0 23 
omitted I-3 1 0 2 13 0 0 0 0 16 
omitted I-6 0 0 11 1 0 0 0 1 13 
omitted I-7 1 11 7 13 0 0 3 9 44 
omitted I-8 0 0 9 0 14 0 0 0 23 
omitted I-9 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 
omitted I-10 82 0 4 11 0 0 0 1 98 
omitted I-11 5 0 7 8 0 0 0 0 20 
omitted I-12 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
omitted I-13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
N/A 4 1 6 5 5 0 0 3 24 
Total  122 18 71 98 20 3 6 19 357 
  
Note: Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Decisions 
omitted: B-1 Proponent failed to meet requirements for ownership of stock entitled to vote on. 
omitted: B-2 Proponent did not provide verification of stock ownership. 
omitted: C Proponent allowed only one proposal. 
omitted: D Supporting statement exceeds 500 words. 
omitted: E-2 Resolution was filed too late for consideration. 
omitted: H-3 
Proponent did not have "good cause" for failure to present the proposal at the previous annual 
meeting; company may exclude proponent's resolutions for the next two years. 
omitted: I-1 Is improper under state law. 
omitted: I-2 Is a violation of state, federal or foreign law. 
omitted: I-3 Contains false or misleading statements. 
omitted: I-4 Relates to a personal claim or redress of personal grievance. 
omitted: I-5 
Relates to less than 5 percent of the company's total assets and less than 5 percent of net earnings and 
gross sales and "is not significantly related" to the company's business. 
omitted: I-6 Deals with a matter beyond the company's power to effectuate. 
omitted: I-7 Relates to the conduct of the company's ordinary business. 
omitted: I-8 Relates to an election to office. 
omitted: I-9 Is counter to a proposal to be submitted by management at the same meeting. 
omitted: I-10 Is moot by being substantially implemented by the company. 
omitted: I-11 Is a duplicate of an earlier-submitted proposal. 
omitted: I-12 Did not receive the required number of votes cast at a previous shareholder meeting. 
omitted: I-13 Relates to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends. 
 TABLE 5 
Summary of the Reasons for Shareholder Proposals Being Omitted by Proposal Sponsors 
 
Table 5 summarizes the reasons for shareholder proposals being omitted by proposal sponsors from 2004 to 
2007. 
Omit Status Individual Religious Union Public Fund Other Institutions Total 
omitted B-1 8 1 3 1 4 17 
omitted B-2 31 1 3 0 0 35 
omitted C 3 0 0 0 0 3 
omitted E-2 9 0 3 1 0 13 
omitted H-3 14 0 1 0 1 16 
omitted I-1 3 0 1 0 0 4 
omitted I-2 22 0 0 1 0 23 
omitted I-3 16 0 0 0 0 16 
omitted I-6 7 0 4 1 1 13 
omitted I-7 17 4 13 4 6 44 
omitted I-8 14 1 3 4 1 23 
omitted I-9 1 0 1 1 1 4 
omitted I-10 88 0 8 1 1 98 
omitted I-11 7 0 9 3 1 20 
omitted I-12 3 0 0 0 0 3 
omitted I-13 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Omitted-NA 16 0 2 4 2 24 
Total  260 7 51 21 18 357 
  
TABLE 6 
Logistic Regression Models Explaining the Omitted Proposals 
Table 6 explains the occurrence of omitted proposals, using logistic regression with adjusted variance. The occurrence of 
omitted proposals is treated as the event. Among TCL firms, there are 251 shareholder proposals that are omitted and 1,043 
proposals that are voted from 2005 through 2007. Marginal effects are defined as the instantaneous rates of change that depend 
on the values of the independent variables, measured at the means.  
  Model I Model II Model III 
Variables 
Marginal 
Effect Z value 
Marginal 
Effect Z value 
Marginal 
Effect Z value 
Individual 0.0993** 2.07 0.0886* 1.71 0.0254 0.39 
Union -0.0727 -1.6 -0.0695 -1.38   -0.1194* -1.95 
Investment Firm -0.0195 -0.33 -0.008 -0.12 -0.0325 -0.51 
Religious -0.0591 -1.33 -0.06 -1.24   -0.0740* -1.74 
Antitakeover -0.1394 -5.36   -0.1399*** -4.62    -0.2013*** -5.22 
Board    -0.1413*** -6.9    -0.1469*** -6.42   -0.1498*** -6.65 
Executive_compenstation     -0.1465*** -5.12    -0.1551*** -4.53   -0.1607*** -3.45 
Voting   -0.2162*** -10.86   -0.2168*** -9.59    -0.2046*** -8.37 
Year 2006   -0.0555*** -2.66     -0.0576*** -2.65    -0.0526** -2.5 
Year 2007   -0.0711*** -3.52   -0.0790*** -3.26   -0.0760*** -3.18 
Firm Size    0.0134*** 3.02     0.0090** 2.05      0.0096** 2.21 
Leverage    -0.1174** -2.42    -0.1067** -20.1    -0.0988* -1.9 
Stock Return -0.029 -0.74 -0.0439 -0.96 -0.0385 -0.86 
E-Index        -0.0240* -1.94    -0.0224* -1.88 
Insider Ownership        -0.3027** -2.55    -0.2800** -2.54 
individual*Antitakeover     
  
   0.1760* 1.68 
Individual*Executive_Comp      
  
0.0363 0.47 
Union*Executive_comp     
  
0.0194 0.24 
Union*Board     
  
   0.2609* 1.86 
Observations 1294 1294 1294 
Wald Chi2 182.47 140.6 148.9 
Log likelihood -545.32 -539.61 -532.2 
  Note: ***, ** and  * represent probabilities less than 1%, between 1%  and 5%, and  between 5%  and 10%, respectively.
 Appendix - The SEC Rule 14a(8) 
The SEC Rule 14a(8) generally requires the company to include the proposal unless the 
shareholder has not complied with the rule's procedural requirements or the proposal falls within 
one of the 13 substantive bases for exclusion described in the table below.  
Substantive     
Basis Description 
Rule 14a-8(i)(1) The proposal is not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws 
of the jurisdiction of the company's organization. 
Rule 14a-8(i)(2) The proposal would, if implemented, cause the company to violate any state, 
federal or foreign law to which it is subject. 
Rule 14a-8(i)(3) The proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commission's 
proxy rules, including rule 14a-9, which prohibits materially false or 
misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials. 
Rule 14a-8(i)(4) The proposal relates to the redress of a personal claim or grievance against 
the company or any other person, or is designed to result in a benefit to the 
shareholder, or to further a personal interest, which is not shared by the other 
shareholders at large. 
Rule 14a-8(i)(5) The proposal relates to operations that account for less than 5% of the 
company's total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and for less 
than 5% of its net earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, and 
is not otherwise significantly related to the company's business. 
Rule 14a-8(i)(6) The company would lack the power or authority to implement the proposal. 
Rule 14a-8(i)(7) The proposal deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business 
operations. 
Rule 14a-8(i)(8) The proposal relates to an election for membership on the company's board of 
directors or analogous governing body. 
Rule 14a-8(i)(9) The proposal directly conflicts with one of the company's own proposals to be 
 submitted to shareholders at the same meeting. 
Rule 14a-8(i)(10) The company has already substantially implemented the proposal. 
Rule 14a-8(i)(11) The proposal substantially duplicates another proposal previously submitted 
to the company by another shareholder that will be included in the company's 
proxy materials for the same meeting. 
Rule 14a-8(i)(12) The proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter as another 
proposal or proposals that previously has or have been included in the 
company's proxy materials within a specified time frame and did not receive a 
specified percentage of the vote. Please refer to questions and answers F.2, 
F.3 and F.4 for more complete descriptions of this basis. 
Rule 14a-8(i)(13) The proposal relates to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends. 
 
